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Richey: Appellate Review of Sentencing: Recommendation for a Hybrid Appro

APPELLATE REVIEW OF
SENTENCING: RECOMMENDATION

FOR A HYBRID APPROACH
Charles R. Richey*
It is a pleasure to participate in this Symposium, which
explores a broad range of problems and possible solutions in the
field of sentencing. Few subjects could be more significant or
thought-provoking at this date. It is my sincere hope that this collection will contribute to the reform of our criminal justice system.
However, those interested in reform of American criminal law
should beware of developing tunnel vision. The ultimate purposes
of sentencing and of appellate review of sentences1 cannot be accomplished without a serious effort to correct the problems of society which have made prisons necessary. The cost of building and
maintaining prisons is astronomical, as is the cost of housing inmates. 2 Reform measures, such as mandatory minimum sentences,
the imposition of lengthier sentences, and the right of the prosecutor to appeal sentence length, will further aggravate these costs.
Whether the cost of these alternatives is warranted in light of the
substantial gains that could be made through applying these resources to eradication of the causes of crime is questionable.
Bather than solely addressing the incarceration of society's wrong* Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A.B., 1945,
Ohio Wesleyan University; LL.B., 1948, Case Western Reserve University. Judge
Richey serves on the Council of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar
Association and has chaired the Section's committee on Sentencing, Probation, and
Parole. He is vice chairman of the executive committee, National Conference of Federal Trial Judges.
1. For a description of the purposes of sentencing, see text following note 15
infra; Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case
Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1454-55 (1960). For a description of the purposes of appellate review, see text accompanying note 63 infra; ABA STANDAms RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES Standard
20-1.2 & Commentary at 4-5 (Approved Draft 1978). The ABA is currently undertaking a complete revision and codification of the standards originally promulgated by
its Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. Chapter 20 of this new codification, Standards 20-1.1 to -3.3, sets forth standards for appellate review of sentences
and is hereinafter cited as 1978 ABA APPELLATE REVIEw STANDARDS.
2. See Wicker, Prop. 13 vs. New Prison Cells, Wash. Star, Oct. 2, 1978, at A-9,
col. 4.
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doers, more energy and resources should be devoted to the reduction of crime through alternatives to incarceration and meaningful
community service.
INTRODUCTION

This Article is limited to discussion of appellate review of sentences. For at least the last decade, there has been increasing discussion of this subject by those involved in the criminal justice
system. 3 Much disagreement exists concerning how much power
the appellate court should have: Should the appellate court be empowered to increase the sentence or merely decrease it?4 I believe
that appellate review should be made available, but only to reduce
sentences at the request of the defendant. The controlling principle
behind sentencing must be that to err on the side of leniency is far
less grievous than to err on the side of severity. Trial judges should
state their reasons for the sentences they impose. This would provide a proper basis for appellate review and would better inform
defendants and the public of the rationale for sentencing decisions.
This Article first surveys the arguments advanced for and
against appellate review of sentences. It then discusses proposals
that have circulated with regard to this issue. Finally, it presents
the approach I favor, the hybrid approach. This alternative would
permit only defendants to appeal sentences and would not allow
3. For a bibliography, see ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 158
app. (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW
STANDARDS]. See also Dix, JudicialReview of Sentences: Implicationsfor Individual
Disposition, 1969 LAW & SOC. ORD. 369; Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Ra-

tional Sentence: A Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV. 463
(1974).
4. This disagreement is graphically illustrated by the contradictory positions

taken by the ABA Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration
of Criminal Justice and its subordinate committee, the Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review. The Advisory Committee recommended that no increase of
sentence be permitted on appeal or remand. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW
OF SENTENCES § 3.4 & Comments a-g at 55-66 (Tent. Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as

1967 ABA TENTATIVE APPELLATE REVIEw STANDARDS]. The Special Committee,
and ultimately the House of Delegates, rejected this recommendation. On February
19, 1968, the House of Delegates voted 95 to 75 to delete § 3.4. The Supplement to
the Approved Draft of the 1968 Standards explains this decision. See 1968 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 3, §§ 3.1 -.3, Comments a-c at 2-5 (Approved Draft Supp. 1968). This rejection of the Advisory Committee's recommen-

dation has been often overlooked by commentators. See, e.g., P. O'DoNNELL, M.
CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 62

& n.16 (1977).
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the appellate court to increase the sentence imposed at the trial
court level.
PROS AND CONS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The origin of the rule of nonappealability of sentencing decisions has been attributed by some to historical accident and by
others to the automatic nature of penalties mandated by the common law. Congress conferred jurisdiction upon the appellate circuit
courts in 1879 to pronounce final sentence in case of the affirmance
of a conviction. 5 The language granting jurisdiction to "pronounce
final sentence" was omitted from the 1891 Act creating the courts
6
of appeals.
Courts have interpreted this variation in phraseology between
the two acts to eliminate appellate review of sentencing. 7 However, the legislative history of the 1891 Act reveals that Congress
intended to retain appellate authority to review sentences, despite
its omission of the "final sentence" language." Thus, the rule of
nonappealability is an anomaly: 9 It is the result of an historical accident and devoid of any principled significance.10
Some commentators assert that the rule evolved during the
common law period, the result of a general loss of interest in the
criminal defendant once convicted. At that time trial judges had
virtually no discretion when imposing sentences." Approximately
5. Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354.
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 11, 26 Stat. 826.
7. Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S.
600 (1919); Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473 (9th Cir. 1900). For a recent case
relying on Freeman, see United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1971).
8. See Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 467-68. For an analysis of the implications of the 1891 Act for the rule of nonappealability, see id. at 463-471.
9. "Our lack of review of sentencing is an anomaly in our judicial system. It is
presently the only [judicial] decision that I know of in a criminal case ... that is not
reviewable." Hruska, Appellate Review of Sentences, 8 AM. CasM. L.Q. 10, 11 (1969).
See Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review, 41
A.B.A.J. 13 (1955). However, a defendant can generally appeal an illegal sentence,
even in those jurisdictions which provide no formal mechanism for appellate review
of sentences. See, e.g., Watkins, Appellate Review of the Sentencing Process in
Michigan, 36 U. DET. L.J. 356 (1959).
10. Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 471. See Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 207, 214-15 (1971);
Hruska, supra note 9, at 11; Note, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need for a
Reviewable Record, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1357, 1358-60.
11. See Coburn, supra note 10, at 207; Comment, PresentLimitations on Appellate Review of Sentencing-McGee v. United States, 58 IowA L. REv. 469 (1972).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

3

HOFSTRA
LAWReview,
REVIEW
Hofstra Law
Vol.

7, Iss. 1 [1978], [Vol.
Art. 57: 71

two hundred offenses were punishable by death; thus uniformity of
sentences hardly presented a problem.' 2 After conviction, " 'the

judge acted merely as a channel through which the Law expressed
its predetermined and impartial decision.' "13 Review of the sentence would have been of no consequence.
Although the rule of nonappealability is the result of historical
accident, rationalizations for the rule have evolved. The most commonly relied upon justification is that trial judges are in a better
position than appellate judges to carry out the sentencing process.

In the words of Judge Frankel,
It is said often that sentencing is a matter of "discretion," as
distinguished from "law," and hence is unsuited for inclusion
among the "questions of law" that comprise the domain of appellate courts. Interwoven with this theme is the conventional
assertion that the trial judge has the unique and unreproducible
advantages of seeing the defendant, "sizing him up" and possessing from daily exposure a seasoned wisdom in the use of such
firsthand impressions. Appellate judges studying a "cold record"
are in this light unable to contribute, but will only impair the
4
sentencing process with their second guesses.
12. Coburn, supra note 10, at 207-08.
13. Id. at 207 (quoting Morris, Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 AUSTL. L.J.
186 (1953)).
14. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 82-83 (1973). This argument has been
similarly described by other commentators. "[S]entencing is not a matter of facts
or truth, it is a matter of judgment." Hruska, supra note 9, at 14.
The word "sentence" derives from the Latin verb sentire, to feel. The
derivation is apt, for in fashioning a criminal sentence the judge, more than
in any other judicial task, must draw upon his own values, insight, and intuition, respond to the parameters of the situation and the character of the individual before him, and strive to achieve what he can only sense will be a
just and fair disposition .... [Alt heart, sentencing decisions are more inductive than deductive, more a product of creative inference than of scientific
proof, and far more impressionistic than we like to admit.
Renfrew, Sentence Review by the Trial Courts: A Proposal to Amend Rule 35, 51
IND. L.J. 355, 355-56 (1976) (emphasis in original). "Since sentencing is meant to be
a discretionary decision, review would be a useless interference with that discretion." P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 61.
[Piersonal observations of a defendant's appearance and demeanor lead ...
[the court] ...

to a more appropriate sentence.

...[Tlhe trial judge has an opportunity constantly to observe the defendant and his reactions to various developments occurring in the presentation of evidence ... [and] may be more capable of analyzing the defendant's
interests, motivations and values than even those appellate judges having
the time to digest a trial transcript.
Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 495. "[Tlhe sentencing judge is in a superior
position, because of his personal involvement in the transaction, to determine the
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A more convincing corollary to, or perhaps rationale for, this
notion of the trial judge's discretion is that there is no consensus
on the objectives of criminal sanctions. This has forced the process
to be a subjective rather than a rational one.' 5 Rehabilitation, isolation, deterrence, community condemnation, and retribution have
all been invoked as goals of the sentencing process. 16 To make a
reasoned sentencing decision, a judge must ascertain which objective has priority and the relationship between the objectives in
each particular case. 17 The absence of any consensus on the relationship between conflicting objectives makes this task difficult.
Those who favor appealability of sentences question the factual
basis of the "better position" argument and call for limiting the
broad discretion given the sentencing authority by establishing articulated standards which must be followed when sentence is imposed. They argue that the vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of on guilty pleas; thus, in most cases, the trial judge does
not observe or interact with the defendant for any prolonged
period.' Even when the trial judge does have the opportunity to
observe the defendant throughout a trial, courtroom demeanor can
be grotesquely distorted and may be an invalid consideration in the
sentencing decision. 19 The notion that "trial judges are invited to
proceed by hunch, by unspoken prejudice, by untested assumptions, and not by 'law,' "20 argues in favor of judicial review rather
than against it.2 1 As stated by Judge Frankel,
Correctly understood, the "discretion" of judicial officers in our
system is not a blank check for arbitrary fiat. It is an authority,
within the law, to weigh and appraise diverse factors (lawfully
most appropriate type and degree of penal sanction." Coburn, supra note 10, at 216
(footnote omitted). For cases succinctly stating this position, see United States v.
Lowe, 482 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Latimer, 415 F.2d 1288 (6th
Cir. 1969).
15. See Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72
MicH. L. REv. 1161 (1974); Renfrew, supra note 14, at 356 n.2; Note, supra note 1,
at 1454-55.
16. See Note, supra note 1, at 1455.
17. Id. at 1455 (citing Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404-06 (1958)).
18.

See M. FRANKEL, supra note 14, at 82-83; P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN &

D. CURTIs, supra note 4, at 61; Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 495-96.
19. Kutak & Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 496 (quoting Hearings on S.2722 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1966) (statement of Judge Sobelofi)).
20. M. FRANKEL, supra note 14, at 84.
21. Id.
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knowable factors) and make a responsible judgment, undoubtedly with a measure of latitude and finality varying according to
the nature and scope of the discretion conferred. But "discretionary" does not mean "unappealable." Discretion may be
abused, and discretionary decisions may be reversed for abuse.
• . . One way to begin to temper the capricious unruliness
of sentencing is to institute the right of appeal, so that appellate
courts may proceed in their accustomed fashion to make law for
22
this grave subject.

The process of evolving general sentencing principles will require a judicial consensus on the interrelationship of the various
objectives of sentencing. However, because judges have little control over the quality of facilities and the nature of services available
to those convicted of crimes, these objectives are, to some extent,
determined by the other branches of government.
Another frequently voiced objection to making sentences subject to appeal is the potential impact that such a change might
have on the dockets of appellate courts. 2 3 Appellate judges have
expressed concern that their tribunals will be flooded with frivolous
appeals. In the words of Judge Friendly:.
But I hope there will be enough good judgment in Congress to
realize that adoption of [appellate review] would administer the
coup de grace to the courts of appeals as we know them. The
problem of volume is not so much with the cases where a sentence is imposed after a trial, since most of these will be appealed anyway and the sentence would be just one more point
to be considered, although sometimes an important and difficult
one, but with the great mass of convictions, nearly 90% of the
total, obtained on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. If the sentences in only half these were appealed, and that seems a con22. Id. (emphasis in original). A judge's powers over a person convicted of a
crime include the following options: (1) He or she can sentence the person to a

definite term of years, chosen from the minimum-maximum range set by the legislature; (2) at times a sentence can be imposed for an indeterminite term; (3) the defendant can be placed on probation; (4) a split sentence can be imposed; (5) at times
youth correction procedures can be used; (6) at times a sentence under the juvenile
delinquincy acts can be imposed; or (7) he or she may use variables including fines,
suspended sentences, deportation, etc. Hruska, supra note 9, at 10-11. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment, but
Court expressed no view on constitutional status of inattention which failed to rise to
that level).
23. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHUOGIN & D. Cumis, supra note 4, at 60-61;

Coburn, supra note 10, at 218; Dix, supra note 3, at 372; Kutak & Gottschalk, supra
note 3, at 507-10.
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servative figure since most proponents of appellate review of sentences reject out of hand the main device, a possible increase of
sentence on an appeal by the defendant, that may have a limiting
effect, the caseload of the courts of appeals would be doubled by
this means alone. While there would not be an equivalent increase in burden, . . .if even a small percentage of those convicted on pleas of guilty should appeal their sentence, "the
'2 4
courts would be swamped."

Commentators have attempted, somewhat successfully, to allay
these fears by pointing out that such concerns are no more than
abstract speculation: Available empirical data indicates that there
has not been a drastic increase in appeals where review of sentences is allowed. 2 5 These commentators suggest that many present
appeals, although by necessity couched in terms of objections to
the process by which the conviction was obtained, are in fact
sought because of dissatisfaction with length of sentence.2 6 Allowing defendant to appeal the sentence directly relieves pressure
placed on the system by misdirected attempts to set aside just convictions on frivolous grounds. Moreover, courts of appeals are presently powerless to reduce a sentence without setting aside the conviction. Consequently, reviewing courts, trapped and bound by the
rule of nonreviewability, overscrutinize cases. This increases their
workload, produces bad law, forces new trials, and may let guilty
27
people go free.
24. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 36 (1973) (citations omitted) (quoting Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542,
578 (1969)). The ABA, however, a strong proponent of appellate review, has not rejected possible increase of sentence on appeal by the defendant as a limiting factor
on the number of appeals taken. On the contrary, the ABA believes that the possibility of an increase in sentence will have just this effect. For discussion of the ABA's
position, in the context of their deletion of Proposed § 3.4, 1967 ABA TENTATIVE
APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3.4, see 1968 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 3, §§ 3.1-.3, Comments a-c at 2-5 (Approved Draft
Supp. 1968); note 4 supra.
25. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 60-61; Coburn,
supra note 10, at 218-19; Dix, supra note 3, at 372-74.
26. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHuRGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 60; Coburn,
supra note 10, at 218 (citing 1968 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note
3, at 3); Hruska, supra note 9, at 12.
27. "[S]traight-forward review of sentences would eliminate the well-known
charade ... of searching through a trial record and making new (and not necessarily
wise) law about the conduct of trials for the purpose of reversing a conviction and
remanding for a complete new trial because the sentence imposed was excessive."
P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 60. See Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932); Hruska, supra note 9, at 12 ("I am acquainted
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Workload concerns should not stand in the way of appealability, even at the risk of more crowded dockets. In every instance of
expanded judicial power, courts are confronted with the spectre of
floodgates opened wide. However, it is our duty and responsibility
to press on where justice requires. This is our singular mission.
Opponents of appellate review maintain that the right to appeal a sentence is unnecessary because the executive branches of
state and federal governments have the power to pardon; this can
serve to remedy gross violations of fairness. 28 Proponents correctly
respond that the judiciary should have its own mechanism to
remedy injustice and thereby cure its own abuses. 29 The courts
should not have to rely on other branches of government to ensure
that justice is done. Moreover, the pardoning power cannot be
relied on to determine the fairness of every sentence imposed by
every trial judge in the nation. A more systematic approach is necessary.
Some who oppose appellate review also fear that making0
sentences reviewable may cause appellate judges to barter votes.3
For example, if a defendant appeals his or her conviction on the
basis of a procedural error, and the government cross appeals to increase the sentence, there could be a difference of opinion regarding the disposition of the appeal among the three judges on the appellate panel: One judge might favor reversing the conviction; two
might support an affirnance, one with an increased sentence, the
other with a decreased sentence. The judge who advocates a reduced sentence has the swing vote. He or she could either induce
the judge favoring an affirmance to agree not to increase the sentence, or persuade the judge supporting reversal to vote to affirm
with a reduction of sentence. However, as the common law of
sentencing evolves, if such trading should occur, it will not necessarily distort the law as much as the present inability of courts of
appeals to redress excessive sentences except by challenging the
validity of the conviction. Moreover, granting courts of appeals
power to review sentencing would remove the pressure on judges
to find technicalities. 31 This should lead to more consistency in the
with appellate judges who have reversed criminal convictions on technical grounds
when their true dissatisfaction was with the sentence. Hard cases make bad law, law
which the lower courts must then face and deal with."); Note, CriminalLaw-Power
of Appellate Court to Modify Sentences on Appeal, 9 Wis. L. RPv. 172, 176 (1934).
28. Dix, supra note 3, at 371 (citing Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 268, 279-80 (1962) (remarks of Judge Walsh)); Sobeloff, supra note
9, at 17.
29. Sobeloff, supra note 9, at 17.
30. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 14, at 79-82.
31. See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
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law and is a goal toward which we should strive.
A further objection to the appealability of sentencing decisions
is that if an increase of sentence is permitted on appeal, such increase is unconstitutional. Opponents of increased sentences on
appeal make three constitutional objections. First, they argue that
such a provision would deny equal protection. Essentially, this argument is that the scheme discriminates against defendants seeking a new trial, because only those seeking a new trial would be
exposed to the risk of a more severe sentence. 32 Those in favor of
33
increased sentences on appeal rely on North Carolina v. Pearce,
in which a defendant received a more severe sentence on retrial,
after his conviction had been set aside by the court of appeals. In
Pearce the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t simply cannot be said
that a State has invidiously 'classified' those who successfully seek
new trials, any more than that the State has invidiously 'classified'
those prisoners whose convictions are not set aside by denying the
members of that group the opportunity to be acquitted." 3 4 The
reasoning of Pearce suggests that equal protection would not be
violated by permitting an increased sentence on appeal.
A second constitutional argument is that due process would be
violated because those exercising their right to appeal would be
35
penalized by the possibility of an increasedasentence on appeal.
This issue is not resolved in the Pearce opinion, but language in
the opinion seems to indicate that such a scheme may violate due
process. The Court in Pearce stated that "avenues [of appellate review] must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede open and equal access to the courts." 36 However, state
schemes that allow an increase of sentence on appeal have been
upheld by federal courts on several occasions. 3 7 Nevertheless, such
a scheme raises serious due process issues, and on that ground
alone should be avoided.
A third constitutional objection claims that any increase of sentence on appeal would violate the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment because a trial judge's sentencing decision constitutes an "implicit acquittal" of any harsher sentence. 38 Thus, an
32.
33.

P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 62 & n.19.
395 U.S. 711 (1969).

34. Id. at 722-23 (emphasis in original).
35. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CuRTIs, supra note 4, at 62.
36. 395 U.S. at 724 (citations omitted).
37. Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972); Walsh v. Picard, 328 F.
Supp. 427 (D. Mass.), affd, 446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971).
38.

P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTis, supra note 4, at 63 & n.24. See

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), in which the Court ruled that the de-
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increased sentence would be multiple punishment for the same offense. 39 In recent cases, the Supreme Court appears to be defining
double jeopardy to refer only to the right of defendants not to be
40
subjected twice to a trial on the question of guilt or innocence.
Thus, appellate review of sentence on appeal by the prosecution
would not involve any intrusion on this protected interest of the
defendant. 41 I believe, however, that such a provision approaches
the bounds of what is not permissible under the double jeopardy
clause, and therefore should not be enacted.
Another concern of those opposed to appellate review of sentences is that the government will use the power to appeal sentences
as a tool of intimidation to discourage defendants from exercising
their right to appeal. 42 This possibility of abuse makes intolerable
any right of the government to seek a heavier sentence on appeal.
Such a right would open the whole system to wide criticism and add
unnecessarily to the present vast powers of the state.
The remainder of this Article first discusses the evolution of
the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, which now advocate allowing both the defendant and the prosecution to appeal the sentencing decision of
the trial judge. It then suggests why there should be a right to appeal sentences by defendants, but no appellate right to increase
sentences, especially on appeal by the government. In addition, it
explicates the importance of articulation by trial judges-in writing
and on the record-of the reasons for the sentences they pronounce.
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION APPROACH:

1967 TO 1978

In 1967, the ABA Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review recommended appellate review of sentences with two qualifi43
cations: (1) The right to appeal should be limited to defendants;
fendant could not be retried for first-degree murder after his conviction for second-

degree murder was set aside, because the conviction for second-degree murder was
an "implicit acquittal" of the first-degree murder charges. Id. at 190.
39. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 63.
40. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Jenkins,
420 U.S. 358 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
41. 'See P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 63; 1978
ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard 20-1.1, Commentary at
2. Contra, 1967 TENTATIVE ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 4, §
3.4, Comment b at 56.
42. P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 4, at 63.
43. 1967 ABA TENTATIVE APPELLATE REViEW STANDARDS, supra note 4, §
3.4(a) & Comment b at 56.
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and (2) there should be no appellate power to increase sentences
on appeal, nor should the trial court be permitted to increase sen-

tences on remand. 44 This second limitation was embodied in section 3.4 of the 1967 tentative draft of the ABA Standards Relating
to Appellate Review of Sentences. 4 5 This provision is further ex-

panded in the commentary to the tentative Standards:
[T]he Advisory Committee has concluded that the state should
not be permitted an appeal that could result in an increase of
the sentence. One objective of subsection (a) is thus to reflect
this conclusion.
[..
[T]here is the prospect of serious constitutional difficulties if an increase is allowed on an appeal by the state. Persuasive arguments can be advanced both under a due process and a
double jeopardy provision. While there appears to be no United
States Supreme Court precedent directly on point, there is a
trilogy of cases which can be read to indicate that an appeal by
the state which resulted in an increase would violate the double
jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment. See Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Trono v. United States, 199
U.S. 521 (1905); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
Similar problems would no doubt arise under many state con46
stitutions.
On February 19, 1968, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
the bulk of the Advisory Committee's recommendations, but rejected section 3.4. 47 The Standards as approved limited appellate
review of sentences to appeals initiated by the defendant,4 8 but
empowered the appellate court to increase sentence on such ap-

peals. 49 The 1968 Standards did not, however, permit appeal of
sentence by the prosecution. This would change.
Two years later, the president of the American Bar Associa44.

1967 ABA TENTATIVE APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS,

supra note 4,

§

3.4(a)-(b).
45.

Id.

46. Id. § 3.4, Comment b at 56.
47. For discussion of this rejection of § 3.4 by the House of Delegates in the
context of the contradictory positions taken on the section by the ABA Special Committee on Minimum Standards and its subordinate committee, the Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review, see note 4 supra.
48. The commentary to the 1968 Standards indicates that this limitation was
considered implicit in the Standards: "the ... principle of double jeopardy undoubtedly will prevent the state . . . from initiating review of a sentence deemed too
low." 1968 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 3, §§ 3.1-.3, Comment
c at 3 (Approved Draft Supp. 1968).
49. See 1968 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 3, § 3.3(ii).
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tion, Edward L. Wright, addressed a letter to then-Congressman
Richard H. Poff of the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning whether the government should have the right of appeal in a
criminal case. 50 This arose in the context of whether section 1001(a)
of Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,51 then before the Congress, was consistent with the ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences. This section of Title X contained a provision allowing the government to appeal sentences in
organized crime cases. The letter, in substance, clearly indicated
that the ABA supported the government's right to appeal. 52
In August 1978, the House of Delegates approved new
standards allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge's sentence. Standard 20-1.1(b) provides, in part, that "[a]ppeal should
be available on the initiative of the defendant or the prosecution
or, in case of cross-appeals, on the initiative of both parties."5 3 The
commentary to this section explains that the ABA altered its view
of this crucial issue because of a perceived change in events since
1968:
The number of jurisdictions in this country in which appellate review of sentences is available is steadily growing. Over
half of the states now permit review of the merits of sentences in
some circumstances .... The National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals strongly endorsed the concept of appellate review of sentences in its 1973 report on
Courts....
• . . In August 1976, the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
...concluded that (1) review of a criminal sentence should be in
a court of appeals and (2) there should be a right of appeal by
both the defendant and the prosecution. . . . Meanwhile Congress has been actively considering a major revision of the Federal Criminal Code. The Senate version of that legislation, familiarly known as the Kennedy-McClellan Bill, contains a broad
right of review of sentences at the initiative of defendants or the
54
government.
50. Letter from Edward L. Wright to Richard H. Poff (Oct. 2, 1970).
51. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1061(a), 84 Stat. 950 (codified in U.S.C. § 3576
(1976)).

52. Letter from Edward L. Wright to Richard H. Poff (Oct. 2, 1970).
53. 1978 ABA APPELLATE REvIEW STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard 201.1(b).
54. Id. Standard 20-1.1, Commentary at 1-2 (citations omitted). The reference to
the Kennedy-McClellan bill is to S.1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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Perhaps, however, the most influential factor in the ABA's decision was the approach taken by the Supreme Court on the double
jeopardy issue. In United States v. Wilson,5 5 the Court remarked:
"The development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its
common-law origins thus suggests that it was directed at the threat
of multiple prosecutions, not at Government appeals, at least
where those appeals would not require a new trial." 5 6 The Court
thus appeared to define double jeopardy only as the right of defen57
dants not to be tried twice on the question of guilt or innocence.
Because appellate review of sentences on appeal by the prosecution
allegedly does not involve any intrusion on this protected interest
of defendants, the ABA regrettably concluded that the new
Standard 20-1.1 would withstand constitutional scrutiny. 58
In deciding to permit the prosecution to appeal a sentence,
the ABA reasoned that if appeals from sentencing could only be
initiated at the behest of the defendant, "there would be no other
way to provide even partial implementation of the desideratum of
evenhandedness in appellate review." 5 9 The defendant would appeal sentences which were unreasonably high, but the prosecution
60
would be helpless to appeal those which were unreasonably low.
A HYBRID APPROACH TO THE NEED FOR
APPELLATE REVIEW:

No

INCREASE IN SENTENCE

61

The reasons supporting the 1978 ABA standards for appellate
review of sentencing provide a firm foundation for adoption of a
general principle of appellate review of sentences. However, they
do not overcome the strong reasons, founded on social policy and
experience, against providing the government with the right to
seek increases of sentences in appellate proceedings initiated by
either the government or the defendant.
The ABA's primary justification for its position on appellate
review is the need to moderate the wide disparity in sentences
55.

420 U.S. 332 (1975).

56. Id. at 342.
57. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
58. 1978 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard 201.1, Commentary at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. For proposed federal legislation similar to this approach, see H.R. 13959,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1978) (to be codified, if enacted, in 18 U.S.C. § 30103).
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imposed for similar crimes.62 This disparity is produced by a criminal justice system which requires individual judges to exercise their
discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence within the wide
range of current statutorily authorized sanctions. The purposes of
appellate review, as set forth in Standard 20-1.2, are:
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the
sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process;
(iii) to facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an offender by
reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities among the sentences of comparable offenders; and
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria

63
for sentencing which are both rational and just.

The present system of sentencing by trial judges, the 1978
commentary suggests, permits the idiosyncracies and errors in
judgment of sentencing judges to affect the sentencing process to
an intolerable degree. 64 Trial judges have engaged in this broad
discretionary exercise without explaining the reasons for the sentences they have imposed. The result has been a lack of uniformity
and predictability in the decisions of sentencing judges. There
exists no real body of wisdom based on well-reasoned decisions of
many judges in a variety of circumstances. In addition, and central to the ABA's view, imposing divergent sentences for similar
crimes under similar circumstances gives the system an appearance
of arbitrariness and produces an increase in hostility on the part of
the public and sentenced offenders. 65 The ABA's conclusion that
the delineation of rational principles for the fair and consistent imposition of sentences would improve the effectiveness and moral
validity of the criminal justice system 6 6 is absolutely correct. This
end is better achieved through effective appellate review of sentences, sought by the defendant, than through the harsh alternative
of mandatory minimum sentences. Adequate review is dependent
on trial courts providing explanations for their sentencing deci62. 1978 ABA
Commentary at 4.

APPELLATE REVIEw STANDARDS,

supra note 1, Standard 20-1.2,

63. Id. Standard 20-1.2.

64. Id. Standard 20-1.2, Commentary at 4-5.
65. Id. Standard 20-1.2, Commentary at 5.
66. Id.
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sions. Review from the relatively detached position of appellate
courts can further legitimize the sentencing process by fostering
the development of a coherent body of legal principles and factual
precedents to which trial judges may look for guidance. However,
permitting appellate courts to increase sanctions imposed by the original trial court would undermine the desired goal of increasing
the sense of fairness and equality with which offenders and the public view the sentencing process. Any procedure which appears to
allow the government to have "two bites at the apple" increases
67
the sense of frustration and alienation felt by criminal defendants.
The commentary which accompanies the tentative 1967 ABA Standards concerning appellate review of sentencing cited as authority
for its rejection of the power to increase sentences on appeal, either
by the defendant or the state, the report of the Donovan Commission. 68 The ABA's Advisory Committee found implicit in the Donovan Commission's report the conclusion that "in the rare case in
which it is invoked, exercise of the power [to increase sentences
on appeal] may do more harm with respect to rehabilitation of
the defendant than the good it does to the ends of justice."6 9 Any
further deterioration in the fairness of the criminal justice system,
as perceived by defendants, far outweighs the advantages reaped by
society in the few cases in which appellate power to review the lenity of sentences would remedy the most egregiously inadequate sentences imposed under the current system.
Furthermore, as is indicated by the data relied upon by the
Advisory Committee in its tentative 1967 Standards, it is unlikely
that appellate power to increase sentences would correct the most
extreme cases of excessive lenity in sentencing. These abuses probably occur in the context of bargained-for guilty pleas: If sentencing
increases were permitted, such bargains would undoubtedly soon
include prohibitions of government appeals of the sentences,
thereby precluding appellate increase of sentences where it is most
needed. Appellate increase of sentences would therefore not sig67. It should be noted that the government has no constitutional right to appeal
a sentence. The Bill of Rights only protects the defendant's rights-not the government's.
68. 1967 ABA TENTATIVE APPELLATE REVIEV STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3.4,
Comment c at 58-59. See Interdepartmental Committee on the Court of Criminal Appeal, Report (Cmnd. 2755) (Aug. 1965).
69. 1967 ABA TENTATIVE APPELLATE REVIEW STANDADs, supra note 4, § 3.4,
Comment c at 59. See Appellate Review of Sentences: Hearings on S. 2722 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1966) (statement of Gerhard O.W.Mueller).
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nificantly contribute to the stated purposes of sentence review, as
proposed in the most recent ABA standards.70
Finally, appellate increase of sentences would pose a substantial threat to other significant rights of the criminal defendant. In
particular, the defendant's right to appeal his or her conviction on
the merits would be threatened, as would the right to appeal possibly erroneous rulings by the trial court on pretrial suppression
motions and substantive matters arising during the trial itself. For
example, a defendant who, in good faith, doubts the validity of a
trial court's adverse ruling on a novel search and seizure question
could well be faced with the possibility that the prosecution will
seek an increase in his or her relatively lenient sentence unless the
defendant foregoes appeal of the fourth amendment question. Thus,
the prosecution would be in a position to indirectly prevent the
vindication of important constitutional rights. A similar scenario
could occur in the context of a defendant's appeal on the merits or
appeal of sentence: The defendant could be deterred from appealing a doubtful conviction or severe sentence because of the possibility that a reviewing court would impose a more severe sentence,
rather than overturn the original conviction or decrease the sentence. Such a course would indeed render illusory the right of appeal against an unfair sentence, a right essential to development of
a higher regard for the sentencing process. A defendant who,
seeking to take advantage of the appeal process, is instead subjected to an increased sentence, will consider the right to appeal a
trap set to encourage him or her to give the government a second
chance at securing a heavy sentence, a "stacked deck" indeed.71

CONCLUSION

As we consider solutions to the numerous moral, as well as
legal, problems raised by the sentencing issue, whether raised by
appellate review or otherwise, we must be ever mindful that we
are dealing with human beings, no matter what the nature of their
70.
71.

1978 ABA APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard 20-1.2.
It is arguable that to require a defendant seeking to appeal his sentence to

expose himself to increased liability would counter the increase in court dockets
caused by the new right to appeal sentences on behalf of defendants. The problem of
crowded dockets, however, is better dealt with through the appointment of more
judges. Better work at the time of sentencing by courts, prosecution, and the defense
bar will insure that there will be few sentences from which defendants or the state
wish to appeal.
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crimes. We would do well to be guided by the principles set forth
by the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Misery of Public
Prisons, an organization founded in the early days of our Republic
by the Philadelphia Quakers, with the participation of such leaders
as Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, and William Bradford:
Our obligations are not cancelled by the crimes of the
guilty.
We must extend compassion to the guilty.
Undue suffering must be prevented.
The links which bind the human family together must under
all circumstances be preserved unbroken-there must be no
criminal class.
Such punishments may be devised as will restore them to
virtue and happiness. 72
With these principles in mind, trial judges should strive to impose
sentences that are fair and appropriate. Review of these sentences
should be initiated only at the urging of the defendant to avoid
creating a system of justice which appears "stacked" against an accused. Without this limitation, harm to society caused by this
"stacking" will well outweigh the benefit to society of appellate review at the request of the prosecution.
72.

J. BENNETT, I CHOSE PRISON 71 (1970).
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